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論文内容の要旨  
The battle for corporate control may ultimately lead to the improvement of corporate governance, or the 
plunder of corporate wealth. The goal of hostile takeover regulation is to promote merit-adding takeovers 
while decreasing as much as possible the agency costs between the corporate insiders and shareholders. To 
achieve this goal, the U.S. had adopted a Fiduciary Duty Centered Mode to combine the court trial on 
directors' behavior with federal formality examination on tender offers. The U.K. had adopted a Self-
Regulatory Mode that the non-governmental Takeover Panel had replaced the ex post adjudications with fair 
and swift ex ante conciliations. The E.U. had adopted a Free Choice Mode that allows the Member States to 
transpose the takeover law according to their needs based on a seemingly “unified” European Directive. 
The formation of the three above regulatory frameworks had undergone special historical contexts, 
political jockeying and institutional evolution, these factors together created different path dependences with 
regional characteristics. The top-down two-tier U.S. regulatory framework has distinctive board center 
doctrine features: the fiduciary duty review system established through a series of legal precedents was nothing 
more than an intermediate standard between the Business Judgement Rule and the Substantive Fairness 
Principle. Instead of judicial review, it in fact produced the effect of judicial deference to the directors’ anti-
takeover actions. In comparison, the down-top single-pattern U.K. regulatory framework was obviously 
shareholder supreme: institutional investors as the major shareholders of the companies remained rational 
apathy in corporate governance, but they maintained convenient oversight of their managers by lobbying the 
industrial elites to make private laws which in favor of them. The Takeover Panel is constantly racing with 
public legislators, unifying the interests of the panel committee with the yields-first investors honoring 
traditions. The down-top drafted European Directive had all the characteristics of shareholder center doctrine, 
but the top-down transposition process of it had given Member States the chance to adopt director primacy 
laws and promote trade-protectionism. Interestingly, the E.U.'s dilemma mirrors China's status quo in 
regulating hostile takeovers; the seemingly shareholder-oriented Company Laws failed to guarantee 
shareholders’ legitimate rights and decision power in takeover-related issues; corporate insiders could easily 
elbow out dissent stockholders and utilize management tools for self-perpetuity.  
Originally, China had transplanted its hostile takeover law from the U.S., U.K. and the E.U. After 15 
years of local practice, China had formed its unique regulatory framework (and path dependence) in its semi-
market economy. On one hand, the target board had very limited ex post takeover defensive measures under 
the current law, they then introduced various ex ante anti-takeover provisions into their articles of associations 
utilizing their de facto controlling powers. The duty of care and duty of diligence in Chinese law were 
stipulated through a series of positive and negative lists; this parody of the U.S. fiduciary duty failed to provide 
a comprehensive and fair standard to review the board's behaviors. On the other hand, facing unruly 
managements, the acquirers also went wild and frequently break the bottom line of the Securities Law. 
Breaches of the tender offer procedural requirements, violations of information disclosure rule and other ashy 
behaviors are common practices. Such loopholes came from over-complicated legislations that were vague 
and obscure in nature. Previous hostile takeover cases illustrated that, almost every pending dispute was solved 
by the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s administrative intervention; the “upper intentions” have 
outweighed the substantial law to decide the outcomes of hostile takeovers.  
From this aspect, literal amendments to the articles and clauses of the law are of little use in 
improving the Chinese hostile takeover regulatory framework; the top priority is to get rid of the 
“CSRC centralism” path dependence. To find an applicable alternative path under the current regime, this 
research first draws implications from the Western approaches of the U.S., the U.K., and the E.U.: future 
reform must take the comprehensive and complicated local factors into consideration, such as the 
economic needs, capital market development, supply side reform and other imperative political 
appeals. Despite the fact that the E.U. practice was a falling victim to pork-barrel politics and interests 
exchange between the Member States, the Directive itself is an exemplary paradigm that successfully and 
accurately codified some of the advantages of the U.S. and U.K. approach. At the Macro level, China 
should adopt a U.K. alike regulatory approach referring the E.U.’s codification technique to 
gradually reform the current pro-U.S. regulatory framework. 
This research then reviewed China’s peculiar capital market history, extra-ordinary political 
particularities and systemic inertia in law, and provided detailed suggestions at the Micro level for 
future improvement taking all these social and institutional background into account. 
First, the Chinese Securities Law acknowledge two self-regulatory entities of the Chinese 
securities market – the Stock Exchanges and the Securities Association of China; now it is the time 
to strengthen their supervisory authority. Despite in a very long time, the CSRC would still be the 
uppermost regulator in China, it could little by little delegate more power to the self-regulatory 
entities to achieve higher supervisory efficiency. 
Second, after approximately 20 years growth, institutional investors in China are not as well-
organized as their counterparts in the Western countries. Experiences from the U.K. demonstrated 
that, strengthening the scales and rights of the institutional investors could ultimately push China’s 
relatively primitive takeover law into a modern one. More importantly, in order for the limited self-
regulation to be effective and long lasting, the motives of the regulators must be in congruity with 
the institutional investor shareholders – the overall profitability of the listed companies should always 
be the prior concern.  
Third, ultra vires of the management should be restrained especially in conflict-of-interests 
situations. The Administrative Rules on Acquisition of Listed Company should make it clear that 
without shareholder approval, the board of directors should not take any defensive measures. This is 
not to suggest a blanket ban on all takeover defenses, but the shareholders should have the final say 
of adopting ex post defenses. 
Fourth, considering the severity of the insider control and no functional proprietor of the state-
owned shares in Chinese listed companies, the costs among minority shareholders and controlling 
shareholders are especially high in China. As a result, the direct application of the Board Neutrality 
Rule is grossly inadequate. This research suggests a “modified” Board Neutrality Rule: when 
takeovers are imminent, directors of the board should not take any actions that may frustrate the 
offer bid unless the majority of minority shareholders say otherwise; and it is for the shareholders 
assembly to set the criteria of “minority shareholders”.  
Fifth, the fundamental rights of shareholders stipulated in the Company Law should be 
respected in takeover activities. Shareholders’ right to vote on major issues, to elect and nominate 
directors of the board and to call on interim meetings should not be violated by any means. In light 
of this, some of the anti-takeover provisions in the articles of associations should be nullified; it is 
also important to ensure the proper procedures of shareholders’ resolution have been correctly 
fulfilled.  
Sixth, current Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule has a trigger so low that hostile takeovers can hardly 
happen, meanwhile, partial offers instead of general offers are too frequently allowed in takeovers 
that the interests and lawful rights of minority shareholders are ignored. A higher trigger, combined 
with a stricter general tender offer requirement is optimal and imminent for Chinese securities 
market. Meanwhile, considering state-owned shares percentage varies from company to company, 
and almost every listed company in China has its unique equity distribution, a flexible trigger is very 
important.  
Seventh, the threshold of the current Sell-out Right in public acquisitions is too low. Drawing 
experience from the member states of the E.U., 90% is an optimal line for shareholders sell-out right. 
In addition, it is rational that when minority shareholders exercising the sell-out right, all majority 
shareholders (according to their shareholding ratio) are together responsible for the remnant shares, 
but the acquirer reserves a preemptive right to acquire all the remnant shares. The introduction of a 
Squeeze-out Right is also important in China. 
Eighth, the law should allow moderate discriminative treatment to acquirers of different funding 
source and leverage ratio: the management should have the discretion power of adopting defensive 
measures in acquisitions funded by high-leverage ratio capital or insurance funds, and the 
supervisory body could define to what extent the leverage ratio should be regarded as “high”. 
Ninth, increasing the speed and transparency of takeover activities could help to ease the 
uncertainties in the market. Some of the articles in the City Code largely increases the efficiency of 
tender offers and takeovers, which are of great referential value to Asian countries, especially China. 
 
Key words: corporate control; hostile takeover; regulatory framework; shareholder center doctrine; 
board center doctrine; agency problems. 
Outlines of the Research 
1. Explicate the Three Western Original Regulatory Modes 
The battle for corporate control may ultimately lead to the improvement of 
corporate governance, or the plunder of corporate wealth - the key of hostile 
takeover regulation for the legislators is to set fair and stable rules for the 
participants.1 During this process, the hostile takeover laws could reveal certain 
level of “predilections”: the tradeoff between empowering the board or the 
shareholders’ assembly seems unavoidable. To set order for the securities market, 
the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. had adopted three completely different modes and 
regulatory patterns.2 
2. Refute Traditional Explanatory Theories 
How did the divergence of the regulatory frameworks happen? The traditional 
ownership structure theory was widely adopted to explain the diversity of the 
hostile takeover regulatory framework of the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. 3 The 
logic behind this theory is as follows.  
The listed companies in the U.S. had more dispersed ownership structure than 
their counterparts did in the U.K. or the E.U. Meanwhile, the controlling minority 
structure widely existed in the listed companies of Germany, Finland and the 
Netherlands – some powerful families controlled the companies firmly with only 
                                               
1 Qiong Fu. "Legal Standing of Hostile Takeover." China Legal Science 3 (2017): 227. 
2 For the details and citations of the three original completely different modes and regulatory patterns, 
please refer to infra part III.  
3  See Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. "The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences." Journal of political economy 93.6 (1985): 1155-1177. See also Jensen, Michael C., and 
William H. Meckling. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure." 
Journal of financial economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360. See also Demsetz, Harold. "The structure of 
ownership and the theory of the firm." The Journal of Law and Economics 26.2 (1983): 375-390. 
The U.S.: “Fiduciary Duty Centered Mode” = Formality Examination of Tender Offers by the 
SEC + Modified Judicial Review of Target Board’s Fiduciary Duty of the State Court 
The U.K.: “Self-Regulatory Mode” = Ex Ante Involvement of the Takeover Panel + Ex Post 
Cooperation with the Industrial Associations 
The E.U.: “Free Choice Mode” = United European Directive Codifying the City Code of the U.K. 
+ Member States’ Flexible Transposition of the Directive 
a small portion of shares. As a result, it was easier to takeover listed companies in 
the U.S. than companies in the U.K. or E.U. Therefore, the boards in U.S. listed 
companies were allowed to take anti-takeover defensive measures, while the 
boards in the U.K. or E.U. were prohibited from warding off unfavorable 
takeovers. 4  
However, recent empirical studies showed that, the ownership structure in 
U.S. listed companies was not diffused as expected and dual-ownership structure 
and share pyramiding was very common in the U.S. 5 As we will explain in detail 
in this research, the situation of the listed companies was much more complicated. 
In sum, the traditional ownership structure theory was flawed, and was insufficient 
to explain the hostile takeover regulatory differences between the U.S., the U.K. 
and the E.U. 6 
3. Retrospect the Unique Legal History of the U.S, the U.K. and the E.U. 
The author believes that, the reasons behind the divergence of the modes are 
comprehensive. Path dependence theory implies that, historical factors and 
localities had set the basic tones for the hostile takeover regulatory frameworks 
long long ago, even though some of the past circumstances are now no longer 
relevant.  
The history of the U.S. hostile takeover regulations could trace back to the 
early 1920s. The failure of the Blue Sky Laws and the financial crisis of 1929 
resulted in President Roosevelt's aggressive reform and reconstruction of the 
banking and securities' industry. 7  The populist-dominated U.S. congress 
consecutively passed the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Glass-Steagall Act and the Banking Act of 1935,8 federalizing the regulation of 
the securities market9 and establishing a tradition of separate management of 
commercial and investment banks. 10 Proxy contests first appeared in 1954, and 
                                               
4 See Ventoruzzo, Marco. "Europe's Thirteenth Directive and US takeover regulation: regulatory means 
and political and economic ends." Tex. Int'l LJ41 (2006): 171. 
5 See Carter, David A., Betty J. Simkins, and W. Gary Simpson. "Corporate governance, board diversity, 
and firm value." Financial review 38.1 (2003): 33-53. 
6 For the details and citations of the flawed ownership structure theories, please refer to infra part VI.A.1. 
7 See Loss, Louis, and Edward M. Cowett. Blue sky law. Little, Brown, 1958. 
8  See Hoover, Herbert Clark, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Inflation Overproduction. The great 
depression. Macmillan, 1952. 
9 See Mission, Vision, and Values. https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/mission.html 
10 See Benston, George J. "Required disclosure and the stock market: An evaluation of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934." The American Economic Review (1973): 132-155. 
battles for corporate control became pervasive with the invention of the tender 
offer. 11 Cunning corporate raiders designed coercive offers like the "Saturday 
Night Special", pressing the stockholders rush to tender. 12 On account of this, the 
Williams Act in the 1968 imposed stricter information disclosure and procedural 
requirements on the acquirers.13 In congruity with the federal legal reform, the 
commercial law of Delaware was undergone huge changes since late 1960s as well 
- it largely expanded the liability exemptions for directors, established a loose 
accreditation criterion for self-interested transactions, 14  narrowed the use of 
appraisal rights of dissent shareholders and upheld the Business Judgement of the 
board of directors. 15  In the sequence of landmark trials of hostile takeover 
conflicts in the 1980s, the court recognized that the directors were “of a necessity” 
confronted with a conflict of interest that they may very possible lose their job if 
the takeover succeeds, therefore, the direct application of the Business Judgement 
Rule was inappropriate. In Unocal Corp V. Mesa Petroleum Co. of 1985, a 
scientific interim standard – the Unocal test – came into being. However, as the 
directors of the board were repeated players in case trials and they could utilize 
the company resources to cope with the litigations, it was extremely hard for the 
acquirers to obtain injunctions from the court on the anti-takeover defenses of the 
target company. Eventually, the ostensible mature fiduciary review system 
established in a series of cases was nothing more than an interim standard in 
between the rigorous Substantive Fairness Principle and loose Business 
Judgement Rule. In sum, the Fiduciary Duty Centered Mode of the U.S. was more 
of a judicial deference to the directors' anti-takeover actions than stringent judicial 
review.16 
The history of the U.K. hostile takeover regulations could trace back to the 
end of the Second World War, when the high inflation rate elevated the price of 
                                               
11  See Ikenberry, David, and Josef Lakonishok. "Corporate governance through the proxy contest: 
Evidence and implications." Journal of Business (1993): 405-435. 
12 See Bebchuk, Lucian A. "The case for facilitating competing tender offers: A reply and extension." 
Stanford Law Review (1982): 23-50. 
13 For the details of the Williams Act, please refer to infra part III.A.  
14  See Arsht, S. Samuel, and Walter K. Stapleton. "Delaware's New General Corporation Law: 
Substantive Changes." Bus. Law. 23 (1967): 75. 
15 See Nourse, Victoria. "Passion's progress: Modern law reform and the provocation defense." Yale LJ 
106 (1996): 1331. 
16 For the intact history retrospect of the U.S. hostile takeover regulatory framework, please refer to 
infra part IV.A. 
fixed assets, 17  making companies with land and real estates extraordinarily 
appealing to acute investors. Moreover, the government-imposed dividend 
restriction in the 1950s led to the hoard of cash of many companies, 18 gave rise 
to the outburst of hostile takeovers, for example, Charles Clore's takeover of the 
Shoe Retailer J. Sears and Harold Samuel's takeover of the Savoy Hotel Group.19 
Interestingly, the institutional investors and commercial groups in the U.K. were 
more outraged by the management's ultra vires in taking defensive measures 
without the approval from the shareholders than the hostile takeover attempt per 
se. 20 Such discontent out-broke in the takeover contests between the U.K. Tube 
Investments, the U.S. Reynolds Metal Company, the Aluminum Company of 
America and the British Aluminum. 21 To set order for the increasing merger 
activities within the industry, the Bank of England formed a private legislation 
committee and drafted the first self-regulatory law on takeovers - the Notes on 
Amalgamation of British Businesses, under the close cooperation with the Issuing 
Houses Association, the Accepting Houses Committee, the British Insurance 
Association and London Stock Exchange. 22 This private law evolved into its more 
mature version - the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers of 1968, and the Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers was established based on this code. 23 The Panel had 
nine committee members initially, representing the banks, large corporations, 
business associations and industrial unions. To those commercial elites, ex ante 
interference was more efficient than ex post adjudication. The inchoate 
performance of the Takeover Panel was not as good as expected, it was 
overwhelmed by the steady flow of cases. Fearing the government and public 
power might interfere, the Takeover Panel acted swiftly to improve itself in the 
1970s. 24 Moreover, the Board of Trade supported the Takeover Panel’s back by 
                                               
17 See Benati, Luca. "Evolving post-World War II U.K. economic performance." Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking 36.4 (2004): 691-717. 
18 Id. 
19 For details of Charles Clore’s hostile takeover of the Shoe Retailer J.Sears and Harold Samuel's 
takeover of the Savoy Hotel Group, please refer to infra part IV.B. 
20 See Sheppard, David K. The Growth and Role of U.K. Financial Institutions, 1880-1966. Routledge, 
2013. 
21 See Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the 
peculiar divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1739. 
22 See Roberts, Richard. "Regulatory responses to the rise of the market for corporate control in Britain 
in the 1950s." Business History 34.1 (1992): 183-200. 
23 See Johnston, Alexander. The city take-over code. Oxford Univ Pr, 1980. 
24 See Deakin, Simon, et al. Implicit contracts, takeovers and corporate governance: in the shadow of 
agreeing to inflict administrative punishments on undisciplined bidders and the 
London Stock Exchange also expressed their will to work along with the Takeover 
Panel to delist companies out of line. 25 Since then, the Takeover Panel's sanction 
and penalty power had been inexorably on the increase. With the whole industry 
as its back, the Takeover Panel and its City Code finally became the ultimate 
authority in takeover disputes. Despite the left-leaning Labor Governments in the 
1970s, the Takeover Panel proved its irreplaceability through its impeccable 
performances and proactive self-improvements. All in all, the history of the 
Takeover Panel and the City Code was the history of a self-regulatory system 
racing with the administrative legislation. 26 In order to survive, the Takeover 
Panel had to constantly improve itself to better cater the need of the market, 
meanwhile, it must keep its good reputation as legislative interventionism may 
resurge at any time.27 
The E.U. hostile takeover regulation came into being much later than the U.S. 
or U.K. The notion of “a united European takeover law” started from the middle 
of the 1970s, when the European Council discussed intensely on how to integrate 
its internal market. In a landmark document - Completing the internal market: 
white paper from the commission to the European Council of 1985, the European 
Committee mentioned the necessity of improving the tender offer procedure. In 
1989, the European Committee drafted the Proposal for a Thirteenth Council 
Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids. This 
proposal contained basic equal treatment rule for shareholders and depicted the 
rudiment of the general duty of the acquirers as well as the target management. 28 
Despite the fact that it was based primarily on the City Code, this proposal had 
been severely criticized by the U.K. The Department of Trade and Industry feared 
that codifying the non-statutory self-regulation code might impair Takeover 
Panel's speed and flexibility. The following proposals of 1996, 2000 and 2002 by 
                                               
the City Code. University of Cambridge, 2002. 
25 See Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the 
peculiar divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1769. 
26 Id. 
27 For the intact history retrospect of the U.K. hostile takeover regulatory framework, please refer to 
infra part IV.B. 
28 Linyao Tang. "Power Allocation in Hostile Takeover Regulation: Rethinking Chinese Fiduciary Duty, 
Board Neutrality Rule and Shareholder Rights." TOHOKU Law Review 47 (2017):129. 
the European Council had several innovations. 29  For example, in order to 
improve the efficiency of a united market in Europe and to establish a “level-
playing fields” among all member states, Professor Jaap Winter and his drafting 
team invented the Breakthrough Rule. 30 However, these proposals ignites even 
more controversies and debates between the member states, and “a united 
European takeover law” seem almost impossible. After continuous negotiations 
and compromises, the Italian Representative worked out the idea of “Optional 
Arrangements Rule”, 31 which gave each member state the freedom to apply or 
not apply the controversial Board Neutrality Rule and Breakthrough Rule. In 2004, 
The European Directive on Takeover Bids was finally passed and then came into 
effect afterwards – it “harmonized” the takeover regulation of all E.U. member 
states by giving up the most important essence of the notion of “a united European 
takeover law” – unification.32 
4. Display the Path Dependence Nature and Mechanism of the Three Regimes  
The history retrospect has explained the inevitability of the formation of three 
different hostile takeover regulatory modes, yet it did not fully reveal the path 
dependence nature of the takeover regulations. How did the regulatory systems 
entrench themselves? What accounts the most for the systemic inertia of the three 
regimes? Professor John Armour and David A. Skeel Jr. found that the differences 
in the U.S. and the U.K. takeover law were mainly because the institutional 
investors of the two countries had played very different roles.33 Enlightened by 
their theory, this research attributes the discrepancies and formation of the path 
dependence of the hostile takeover regulatory frameworks of the U.S., the U.K. 
and the E.U. to the different roles of different interest groups, and the contests 
between them. The interest groups include the institutional investors, industry 
associations, labor unions, large conglomerates and so on. 
                                               
29  Magnuson, W. J. (2009). Takeover regulation in the United States and Europe: an institutional 
approach, 12. 
30 See Edwards, Vanessa. "The Directive on Takeover Bids–Not Worth the Paper It’s Written On?." 
European Company and Financial Law Review 1.4 (2004): 416-439. 
31  Magnuson, W. J. (2009). Takeover regulation in the United States and Europe: an institutional 
approach, 12. 
32 For the intact history retrospect of the U.K. hostile takeover regulatory framework, please refer to 
infra part IV.C. 
33 See Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the 
peculiar divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1763. 
Before the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
financial industry of the U.S. had undergone more than 100 years of incomplete 
self-regulation. From the Buttonwood Agreement of 1972 to the Constitution of 
the New York Stock Exchange Board of 1863, inner industry self-regulation was 
the principal constraints of the securities market, and the New York Stock 
Exchange was the most important supervisor. 34  However, the "greedy Wall 
Street" was severely blamed for the cause of the financial crisis of 1929, and the 
public (represented by furious labor unions) and the government (represented by 
the populist Congress) no longer believed that self-regulation was an optimal way 
of supervision, 35 which led to the drastic legal reforms that shifted the power to 
the SEC. The emergence of the hostile takeovers from the 1950s further raised 
the rifts and frictions among the general public and the Wall Street capitalists who 
were referred to as “corporate raiders” and “white collar pirates”. 36 In 1968, 
Senator Williams Harrison spoke candidly that he wanted to ensure the 
management of the company to have enough “gunpowder” to fight back the 
“barbarians at the gate”. 37 The State Courts (mainly the Delaware Courts) had 
get used to defer to the requests of the directors of the board, as they could decide 
where to incorporate their companies. 38 As a result, the legal climate in the U.S. 
was never pro-acquirers. Restrained by these factors and circumstances, future 
corporate lawmaking of the U.S. could hardly swift to shareholder supreme. 
Today’s U.S. regulatory framework is already well-entrenched: it is a pro-
management system with no room for self-regulation.39 
The regulatory preference is quite opposite in the U.K – institutional 
shareholders had influenced the legal climate of the U.K. since the very beginning. 
The punitively high rates of marginal taxation applied to investment income for 
                                               
34 See Hart, Michael A. "Decimal stock pricing: dragging the securities industry into the twenty-first 
century." Loy. LAL Rev. 26 (1992): 843. 
35 See Sorkin, Andrew Ross. Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington 
Fought to Save the FinancialSystem--and Themselves. Penguin, 2010. 
36 See Keller, Elisabeth, and Gregory A. Gehlmann. "Introductory comment: a historical introduction to 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Ohio St. LJ 49 (1988): 329. 
37 See Brown, Meredith M. "The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments." Bus. Law. 26 
(1970): 1637. 
38 See Mitchell, Mark L., and Jeffry M. Netter. "The role of financial economics in securities fraud cases: 
Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission." The Business Lawyer (1994): 545-590. 
39 For the details of the formation of the U.S. legal predilection in takeover related issues, please refer 
to infra part V.A. 
individuals after the World War II completely destroyed the investment 
enthusiasm of independent citizens. 40  The Mutual Investment Scheme then 
promoted the wild growth of institutional investors.41 These stockholders of the 
U.K. listed companies were famous for being passive and indifferent to the 
corporate governance, 42  whenever the performance of the company was not 
satisfactory, they “vote with their feet” by dumping all their shareholding. 
Meanwhile, the institutional investors were inclined to exert their influences on 
legislations directly to ensure that the laws were at their favor,43 but they would 
achieved so without the cooperation of the industrial associations that represent 
their interests. When hostile takeovers first emerged in the U.K., the 
management's ultra vires provoked the institutional investors and their 
associations; they were united together by the Bank of England to promulgate the 
first self-discipline rule of takeovers in the 1950s. During this process, the 
Institute of Directors and Association of British Chambers of Commerce were 
completely excluded from participating.44 As the institutional investors and their 
associations continued to lobby the politicians and the government thereafter, the 
doctrine of “active shareholders, passive directors” of the self-regulatory rules 
were deeply engrained. 45  At last, a shareholder-supremacy self-regulatory 
takeover law became unshakeable.46 
In the E.U., the protests and indignation of the institutional investors, large 
consortiums and labor unions ultimately led the compromises of the European 
Directive. The formation of a “united” European Directive was not only the 
contest between the Member States, but battles between the interest groups, 
                                               
40  See Steinmo, Sven. "The end of redistribution? International pressures and domestic tax policy 
choices." Challenge 37.6 (1994): 9-17. 
41 See Dong, Min, and Aydin Ozkan. "Institutional investors and director pay: An empirical study of 
U.K. companies." Journal of Multinational Financial Management 18.1 (2008): 16-29. See also Khan, 
Tehmina. "Company dividends and ownership structure: Evidence from U.K. panel data." The Economic 
Journal 116.510 (2006). 
42 See Goergen, Marc, and Luc Renneboog. "Strong managers and passive institutional investors in the 
U.K.." Available at SSRN 137068 (1998). 
43 Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the peculiar 
divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1760-1770. 
44 Id. 
45 See Deakin, Simon, et al. Implicit contracts, takeovers and corporate governance: in the shadow of 
the City Code. University of Cambridge, 2002.  
46 For the details of the formation of the U.K. legal predilection in takeover related issues, please refer 
to infra part V.B. 
institutional investors and large conglomerates as well. 47  Although their 
influences were not easy to penetrate the member states’ shell frame, but the 
discontents and objections inevitably would influence the transposition process of 
the final European Directive, causing even larger divergences under a “uniformed” 
European Directive.48 The prominent cases were the Volkswagen’s protests of the 
Board Neutrality Rule and the Wallenberg Family’s severe Condemn of the 
Breakthrough Rule, which more or less contributed to the introduction of the 
Optional Arrangements Rule and the Reciprocity Exception Rule as the 
compromise. In sum, the European Council had immersed into a web of cyclic 
dependencies – whenever it wants to move one step ahead, it ended up in two 
steps back – the endless contests among the member states and the uncoordinated 
interests between the conglomerates had largely constrained its legal progress 
within.  
5. Compare the Three Original Regulations and Seek Implications 
The path dependence nature of the hostile takeover regulatory frameworks is 
a double-edged sword: on one hand, it may restrict future legal reforms; on the 
other hand, it could awake the “internal vigor” and turned the institutional inertia 
into endogenous force of growth. Having strong confidence in their court system, 
the U.S. takeover regulation relies heavily on ex-post judicial review is that the 
U.S. has strong confidence in the court system. Indeed, the U.S. courts, especially 
the Delaware court, is quite capable. Such special infrastructure may not be 
present in other jurisdictions. The U.K., on the contrary, gave the Takeover Panel 
an unprecedented opportunity of self-regulation, and precluded courts 
participants in takeover issues. Both the systems are regarded as the most efficient 
and refined regulatory frameworks for hostile takeovers. 
One very important reflection from the U.S. regulatory framework is that, the 
judicial-review system would inevitably lead to the structural prejudice that favors 
the interest of the board; the judge could only review the cases that are put in front 
of them, and repeated players in trials - the directors are more likely to win. 49 
                                               
47 See Schneper, William D., and Mauro F. Guillén. "Stakeholder rights and corporate governance: A 
cross-national study of hostile takeovers." Administrative Science Quarterly 49.2 (2004): 263-295. 
48 For the details of the formation of the E.U. legal predilection in takeover related issues, please refer 
to infra part V.C. 
49 See Bainbridge, Stephen M. "Director primacy and shareholder disempowerment." Harv. L. Rev. 119 
Previous trial practices in the U.K. also displayed the tendency of the judges to 
tolerant the directors' trenching behaviors. 50  Another insight from the U.S. 
approach is that, the shareholder activism of institutional investors could improve 
the overall corporate governance in U.S. listed companies, but it is almost 
impossible for them to bring big changes to the currently hostile takeover 
regulatory framework. 51  
Comparing with the U.S. and the E.U. model, the self-regulatory framework of 
the U.K is incredibly more efficient in terms of cost and time, offering more 
certainty to the capital market. 52 Both the acquirer and the target board do not 
have to afford far-flung litigation costs and expensive legal service fees as the 
Takeover Panel tackles with takeover disputes with no delay. Moreover, the 
Takeover Panel could proactively amends the City Code to tackle the needs of the 
market, but the judges in Delaware and legislators in the E.U. are relatively passive 
and lagging in upgrading the law.53 However, the formation of a self-regulatory 
framework required the institutional investors, bankers and industrial associations 
to work in congruity – and an important prerequisite for them to achieve this is 
the geographical proximity they had in London. Moreover, in order for the self-
regulatory model to be effective and long lasting, the motives of the regulator must 
be in congruity with the stockholders of the company – to increase the overall 
profitability of the company by cutting unnecessary costs. 54 Indeed, institutional 
investors in the U.K. have various motives, but the overall profitability of the 
company was always their mutual concern, as they had to be responsible for 
investors who put their money in the institutions. The failure of the self-regulation 
in the U.S. was also due to the inconformity of the participants' motives. For 
                                               
(2005): 1735. 
50 For example, the Ampol Petroleum V RW Millers of 1974, the Cayne And Another V Global Natural 
Resources Plc of 1982, the Criterion Props. Plc v. Stratford U.K. Props. LLC of 2002, all illustrated the 
structural prejudice of the court review system. For the detailed explanation of the Delaware Courts’ 
predilections, please refer to infra part VI.A.2. 
51 See Karpoff, Jonathan M., Paul H. Malatesta, and Ralph A. Walkling. "Corporate governance and 
shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence." Journal of financial economics 42.3 (1996): 365-395. For 
the detailed explanation of Shareholders’ Activism’s effect on Delaware’s future lawmaking, please refer 
to infra part VI.A.3. 
52 Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the peculiar 
divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1727. 
53 For the incomparable advantages of the U.K.’s Self-regulatory Mode, please see infra part VI.B.2. 
54 Armour, John, and David A. Skeel Jr. "Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why-the peculiar 
divergence of US and U.K. takeover regulation." Geo. LJ 95 (2006): 1756-1770 
example, the brokers and traders had very different self-interest motives; they 
might froze any deals that would delist the target company, 55 even if the deal were 
beneficial to both the offeror and the offeree. 56 
The European Directive only had little impact in shaping a “united European 
takeover law”. The Board Neutrality obligation could be waived in reciprocity 
situations, and extremely few companies had adopted the Breakthrough Rule. The 
Optional Arrangements Rule let some directors of the board, who had accustomed 
to stay neutral, now asked for larger discretion power in takeover defenses.57 The 
Mandatory Bid Rule provided the shareholders with a fair opportunity to exit the 
company with share premium, however, many of the Member States set the trigger 
of such a Mandatory Bid Rule so high that it was nothing more than a legal 
decoration. 58  Future lawmaking in China must draw lessons from the E.U.'s 
practice,59 and try to avoid the internal contradictions of the legal clauses.  
Moreover, the E.U. model, though designed based on the U.K. model, yielded 
the legal effect similar to the U.S. in the transposition process from the E.U. level 
to its member states. In a cognitive aspect, the unpleasant transition process of 
the European Directive depicts the failure of many Asian countries transplanting 
their takeover law from abroad, notably, China. So much so, the European 
Directive itself offered a paradigm of codifying together the merits of the U.K. 
City Code as well as the pioneer practice of the Delaware court, which could be 
regarded as an excellent template for other Asian countries. In other words, the 
transposition of the European Directive might be a completely failure, but the 
European Directive was merely a falling victim to pork-barrel politics. Its articles 
and clauses were so carefully and articulately trimmed that if all of its core rules 
were completely mandatory for the member states, it could fulfill its original goal 
to construct an integrated market with a level-playing field within the E.U. and at 
the same time promote prosperity of the market for corporate control. Most 
                                               
55 See Michie, Ranald. The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850-1914 (Routledge Revivals). 
Routledge, 2012. 
56 For the functional premise of the U.K.’s Self-regulatory Mode, please refer to infra part VI.B.3. 
57 Linyao Tang. "Power Allocation in Hostile Takeover Regulation: Rethinking Chinese Fiduciary Duty, 
Board Neutrality Rule and Shareholder Rights." TOHOKU Law Review 47 (2017):113-197. 
58 Linyao Tang. "On Exemption of Tender Offer: A Comparative Perspective." Symposium of Economic 
Law. 2(2017):68-76. 
59 For the overall assessment of the European Directive, please refer to infra part VI.C. 
importantly, the European Directive have given thorough consideration and 
protections to the shareholders, especially the minority shareholders, setting an 
exemplary example for countries whose agency costs between the corporate 
insiders and minority shareholders are high.60 
6. Review China’s Regulatory Framework from Legal Aspects 
Some scholars believed that, the Chinese takeover laws were mainly 
transplanted from the U.K.61 The Audit Committee of Mergers and Acquisitions 
under the CSRC was regarded as the counterpart of the Takeover Panel in the 
U.K., and the Administrative Rules on Acquisition was the Chinese version of the 
City Code. However, the ACMA is obviously not a self-regulatory entity; it only 
had very limited authority in takeover disputes. On the other hand, the Chinese 
hostile takeover regulatory framework bears resemblance to the U.S. model as well. 
The CSRC has the ultimate authority oversighting the securities market; it 
functions in a similar way just like the SEC. However, Chinese courts also deal 
with the takeover issues that the CSRC’s administrative supervision alone could 
not reach. In sum, the Chinese regulatory framework took an administrative 
supervisory approach that depends heavily on public law intervention with very 
limited self-regulation. 
In terms of legal clauses and provisions, China has transplanted the takeover law 
from the U.K., U.S and the E.U.  
First, in parallel with the City Code and the Companies Act of the U.K, the 
Chinese Company Law is ostensibly “shareholder centered” – the general 
assembly seems to be the highest authority in corporate issues, and the board of 
directors are responsible for carrying out the general assembly’s resolutions. 62 In 
theory, as all defensive measures, no matter ex ante or ex post defenses, more or 
less concern corporate issues which need the majority approval from the 
shareholders – hence it is the general assembly, not the board of directors has the 
final say of the defensive measures.  
                                               
60 For the detailed content of the European Directive, please refer to infra part III.C; for the detailed 
evaluation of the Directive’s content, please refer to infra part VI. C.  
61  See Bai, Chong-En, et al. "Corporate governance and market valuation in China." Journal of 
comparative economics 32.4 (2004): 599-616. See also Cai, Wei. "Hostile takeovers and takeover 
defences in China." Hong Kong LJ 42 (2012): 901. 
62 2014 Company Law, Article 98.  
Second, just like the takeover laws of the U.K. and E.U., the Chinese Company 
Law directly banned certain takeover defenses such as poison pills, dual ownership 
structure 63  and so on. Equal treatment of shareholders has become a basic 
principle in Chinese Law. 64 In addition, the Securities Law had rigorous merit-
review requirements65 for the target board to issue shares and bonds, making 
share repurchase schemes66, share issuance schemes and convertible securities 
issuance plans67 impossible in hostile takeovers. 68  
Third, in tender offer regulation and investors’ protection, the Chinese Securities 
Law has learnt a lot from the Securities Exchange Act of the U.S. Insider trading, 
market manipulation, false statement and fraud behavior were strictly prohibited. 
Chinese Securities Law and the Administrative Rules on Acquisition also have 
similar information disclosure and tender offer procedural requirements with the 
William’s Act. 69  Disgorgement Statute and share transfer restrictions for 
corporate insiders could also be found in the Securities Law. 70  
Fourth, Chinese law put considerable attention on the board’s fiduciary duty in 
takeovers. The Administrative Rules on Acquisition requires the directors 
“assume the duty of loyalty and duty of care” in takeovers. 71  The Chinese 
Company Law explained what “duty of loyalty” is through a series of prohibitive 
stipulations72 and the Guidelines on Articles of Association has suggested the 
meaning of the “duty of care”. 73 
Fifth, the Chinese Securities Law borrowed the Mandatory Bid Rule from the City 
Code and the European Directive, mandating acquirers reaching 30% 
shareholding of the target company to send out tender offers, either partial or full, 
to all shareholders of the target company. 74  Meanwhile, just like the most 
Member States within the E.U. do, the Securities Law also left abundant room for 
                                               
63 Id, at Article 126. Some originally-born-in-China companies achieved the ownership structure by re-
incorporating in the Cayman Islands and having their IPO either in HKSE or NYSE, for instance, Alibaba. 
64 Id, at Article 103. 
65 2014 Securities Law, Article 13. 
66 2014 Company Law, Article 142.  
67 2014 Securities Law, Article 16. 
68 2014 Securities Law, Article 22 and Article 24.  
69 Administrative Rules on Acquisition, Article 75. 
70 2014 Securities Law, Article 47. 
71 Administrative Rules on Acquisition, Article 8. 
72 2014 Company Law, Article 147. 
73 Guidelines on Article of Associations, Article 98.  
74 2014 Securities Law, Article 88 and Article 96.  
the exemption of tender offer. 75   
Sixth, the Administrative Rules on Acquisition borrowed the Board Neutrality 
Rule from the U.K. and the E.U., but modified into a less rigorous one. This is the 
same case with the Selling-out Right76 from the European Directive.   
7. Illustrate China’s “CSRC centralism” Path Dependence from Past Cases  
China’s seemingly comprehensive, conclusive law is more problematic than 
thorough, not only did it fail to provide explicit answers in certain conflicts; it also 
failed to offer concrete solutions in times of conflicts. As the target board had very 
limited ex post takeover defensive measures under the current law, they then take 
advantage of their de facto controlling powers to introduce self-trenching ex ante 
anti-takeover provisions into the articles of associations. Official data indicates 
that, in 2016 alone, more than 600 A share companies revised their corporate 
charters to adopt ATPs. Until June 2017, more than 620 Chinese A share 
companies adopted ATPs. 77 In this research, the author teased out nine different 
types of anti-takeover provisions from 850 randomly chosen A-share Company 
Articles.78 
On the other hand, facing target board ignoring the duty of care and duty of 
diligence in Chinese law, the acquirers also went wild and frequently break the 
bottom line of the Securities Law. Breaches of the tender offer procedural 
requirements, violations of information disclosure rule and other ashy behaviors 
are common practices. 79When acquirers and the target boards were nearly a draw, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission usually engaged and “hosted” the 
tiebreaker. Previous hostile takeover cases illustrated that, almost every pending 
dispute was solved by the CSRC’s administrative intervention - the “upper 
intentions” replaced the contradictive clauses and become the only decisive 
factors in hostile takeovers. 80 
Baoan's hostile takeover of Yanzhong Industry in 1993 is the first hostile takeover 
                                               
75 Administrative Rules on Acquisition, Article 62. 
76 2014 Securities Law, Article 51. 
77 Jicong Wen. "Over 620 Listed Companies Adopted Anti-takeover Provisions". Economic Daily. 2017-
06-15. Available at http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201706/15/t20170615_23634850.shtml. 
78 For the detailed explanation of the Anti-takeover provisions, please refer to infra part VIII.A. 
79 Linyao Tang. "Pre-warning of Takeover Bids and General Offer in China." Journal of Southwest 
University of Nationalities. 12(2017):108-115. 
80 For the details of the previous hostile takeover cases in China, please refer to infra part VIII.B. 
in China. When Baoan was publicly criticized because of its illegal share 
purchasing without notifying the target company, the CSRC connived Baoan's 
takeover by merely inflicting a fine of 900,000 RMB. 81 In the following cases of 
Dagang Oilfield taking over Shanghai ACE, when the two parties were in 
stalemate because the law could not decide the legality of the anti-takeover 
provisions in the ACE's bylaw, the CSRC coordinated the merger between the two 
(yet it did not explain whether the ATP was legal or not).82 The hostile takeover 
between Shanghai Xinlv and Jindi lasted for more than 4 years; it was settled only 
after the CSRC's administrative intervention. 83 In the nationally famous Baowan 
Dispute, the Baoneng Group had almost guaranteed its success but met its 
Waterloo after CSRC's president publicly opposed leveraged buyout. 84  
Maybe, a privileged and unchallenged supervisory body in China could, to some 
extent, function equivalently just like the Takeover Panel in the U.K., but the 
CSRC’s legal standing is very obscure and constantly changing, which caused the 
uncertainty in the capital market. It did not answer clearly that whether the law 
should give primacy to shareholders protection, or respect the directors’ business 
judgements? Moreover, this top-down “CSRC centralism” had created bigger 
path dependence issues for the participants of takeovers in China – they no longer 
care about what and how the law stipulates, but spend every resources to show the 
impression of weakness in takeovers to the CSRC.  
8. Reveal the Social and Political Aspects for Future Legal Reform  
Apparently, merely amending the articles and clauses of the law is of very limited 
use in improving the Chinese hostile takeover regulatory framework; the most 
important thing is to get rid of the “CSRC centralism” path dependence. Drawing 
experiences from the U.S., the U.K., and the E.U., future legal reform in China 
must take its comprehensive and complicated local factors into consideration. 
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83 Linyao Tang. "Power Allocation in Hostile Takeover Regulation: Rethinking Chinese Fiduciary Duty, 
Board Neutrality Rule and Shareholder Rights." TOHOKU Law Review 47 (2017):157. 
84  China securities regulator chairman condemns "barbaric" company buy-outs by asset managers, 
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There are several facets critical to future lawmaking.   
First, the institutional investors are weak in China. The Chinese institutional 
investors had undergone several phases. The embryonic stage began from 1990 
and ended in 1998, when securities companies were almost the only player in the 
securities market. The growth period began from 1999 and ended in 2008, during 
which the government allowed state-owned and state-controlled listed companies 
enter the stock market. 85 Since December 2002, the State Council began carrying 
out the institution of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, and foreign 
capitals poured into China since 2004. From October 2004, insurance funds were 
allowed to enter the stock market. After 2008, mainstream institutional investors 
in the capital market are securities companies, different types of funds, large 
enterprises, financial companies, commercial banks and Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors. However, comparing to the institutional investors in the 
Western countries, Chinese institutional investors are not mature enough to bring 
substantial changes to the takeover laws.86 Psychologies of herd instinct and great 
fool exert strong influence on the institutional investors' decisions, which give rise 
to myopic behaviors that corrode the market. First, individual investors still 
account for the majority in the stock market, and they are too dispersed to become 
investment communities. Second, current established institutional investors are 
not strong enough to form political associations that have the power to lobby the 
legislators. Third, the market infrastructure and legal supports for institutional 
investors are grossly inadequate. 
Second, self-regulation in China is still in the nascent period. Chinese Securities 
Law acknowledged two self-regulatory entities of the Chinese securities market – 
the Stock Exchanges and the Securities Association of China. 87 However, in 
practice, neither the Stock Exchange nor the Securities Association in China has 
substantial self-regulatory power and the supervisory effects were virtually none. 88 
Historically, these two self-regulatory institutions were not established by the 
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86 For more details of the instutional investors in China, please refer to infra part X.F. 
87 2014 Securities Law, Article 8, 102, 174.  
88 See Wei, Yuwa. "The Development of the Securities Market and Regulation in China." Loy. LA Int'l 
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traders, investors or participants in the securities market; instead, they were 
established and developed by the government in the first place. Current law allows 
the CSRC to designate up to half of their council members, including their general 
managers. Under the vertical control of the CSRC, neither of them could truly 
represent the well-being and interests of its members, but the will from above. 
Moreover, the reputational punishment mechanism is not established yet in 
Chinese capital market, there is still a long way to go for the self-regulation to be 
really effective.89 
In addition, it has been 15 years since the first hostile takeover attempt in China. 
From indiscriminately imitating the law from the Western countries to drafting 
the Administrative Rules on Acquisition with regard to the local conditions, this 
15-year marked the spiral progress of the Chinese securities market. Despite 
several amendments and revisions, the Chinese hostile takeover regulatory 
framework is still insufficient in terms of legislative technique and dispute 
resolution. These defects might be temporarily masked in government-leading 
legal reforms, as the CSRC and the State Council have extremely powerful 
controlling power over the capital market. However, with the intensification of the 
hostile takeovers and the prosperity of the market of corporate control, these 
defects would eventually manifest and even cause disastrous consequences. As we 
have mentioned above, merely literal adjustment of the law could no longer 
improve the hostile takeover regulation anymore – China is in desperate need of 
changing its legal climate and construct necessary legal infrastructure for future 
law making. 
 
9. Chose the Optimal Path for Future Legal Reform 
Path dependence theory also implies that, consistency is the foremost merit 
in hostile takeover regulation. A good hostile takeover regulation should be 
consistent and bring certainty to the capital market. Over the time, the 
participants could adjust their behaviors according to the established preference 
of the law.90 
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The Self-Regulatory Mode of the U.K. had its uniqueness and special 
background - an infancy environment that China could never have. Meanwhile, 
clarifying fiduciary duty is never easy. Instead of writing down simple principles 
of fiduciary duty one by one, the Delaware court employed a two-part 
reasonableness-based tests, to determine whether it is legitimate for the board to 
take defensive measures. Moreover, the Delaware judges had accumulated 
decades of experiences to seize the nature and boundary of directors' fiduciary 
duty;91 China simply lacks the infrastructure of applying a trial-dominant mode. 
The European Directive offered a paradigm of codifying together the merits of 
the U.K. City Code as well as the pioneer practice of the Delaware court, but 
several of its cores rules should be further amended to suit the needs for China.  
To choose the optimal path for future lawmaking, there are several local and 
contemporaneous factors that matter, too, for example, the must to improve large 
companies’ corporate governance,92 the aftershock of the share split reform, the 
practical need to normalize the insurance funds and debt equity and the call of a 
nation-wide supply-side reform.  
The remarkably rapid economic growth based on the "demographic dividend" 
had come to an end after 2015. In order to achieve sustainable growth, the whole 
industries are in desperate need of takeovers and reorganizations to better utilize 
the social resources. Therefore, a legal framework that facilitate takeovers is more 
optimal for China. China should adopt a U.K. alike regulatory approach referring 
the E.U.’s codification technique.93 
10. Propose Detailed Suggestions for Future Lawmaking in China 
The reform of law is always a painful process. China could only step by step 
become closer to an investor-friendly hostile takeover regulatory framework. This 
research has given several detailed suggestions for future legal reform in the 
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92 The state-owned largest shareholder as the supervision entity of the management is virtually non-
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93 For the detailed argument of this statement, please refer to infra part X.I. 
conclusion part,94 including Enhancing the limited self-regulation of the Stock 
Exchange and Securities Association, strengthening the scales and rights of the 
institutional investors, entitling shareholders to the decision power in adopting 
takeover defenses, empowering minority shareholders to participate more in 


























                                               



















































 以上のような 3 つの法圏における企業買収法制の形成過程からは，いずれの
法圏においても，それぞれ固有のシステマティックな硬直性（あるいは経路依存
性）が働いており，様々な社会経済的要因や政治的要因によって全く異なる企業
買収法制が形成されるに至ったことが分かる。中国の企業買収法制を改善して
いくにあたっても，同様の視点が必要となる。米国のデラウェア州ほどに司法制
度が発達することは，大陸法系の司法制度を持つ中国の司法制度には期待しに
くいこと，また，中国のコーポーレートガバナンスは未だ未発達のため，企業買
収を利用したガバナンスの強化が必要であることから，基本的には英国型（ある
いはそれをベースとした EU 型）のアプローチをベースとすることが望ましい。
もっとも，英国型のアプローチを中国において実現するには様々な社会的・経済
的な要因がハードルとなることから，単に英国型の企業買収法制を表面的に模
倣するだけでは足りないと指摘する。 
(3) その上で，本論文は，中国の企業買収法制については，具体的には次のよう
な改善を試みるべきだと提言する。まず第一に，中国証券取引監視委員会（CSRC）
に独占されている監督権限を少しずつ自主規制機関に移していくことが必要で
ある。第二に，中国の現状では，資本市場の発達は未だ不十分であり，自主規制
機関を支えるような機関投資家はまだ十分に機能していないので，機関投資家
を育成していくことが必要である。第三に，法的安定性が実現できておらず，
CSRC による大きな裁量に委ねられている現状の企業買収法制（会社法・証券
法）については，英国型（および EU 型）にならったルールの明確化をはかるこ
とが必要である。すなわち，防衛側経営陣がなし得ることについては大きな制約
を加え，少数派株主の多数決（majority of minority）による同意なくして，防衛
側経営陣はいかなる対抗措置もとれないし，定款を利用した買収防衛策につい
ても一定の制約を加えた上で，証券法による強制公開買付ルールを修正して一
定の状況下において全部公開買付を強制することで少数派株主の保護を図るこ
となどが必要だと主張する。 
 
2. 本論文の評価 
 本論文は，中国における企業買収法制について，米国・英国・EU の比較法を
通じつて解決策を模索するものであるが，その成果については，以下のように評
価できる。 
 第一に，本論文は，比較法を通じて，単なる表面的な法制度の異同に着目する
のみならず，様々な法制度を作り出した社会的・経済的な要因に着目していくこ
とで，それぞれの国において固有の社会的・経済的要因が異なる法制度を生み出
してきたことを明らかにし，中国においてはどのような企業買収法制を構築し
ていくことが実効的かについて，中国固有の社会的・経済的要因に着目しつつ議
論を展開している。 
 会社法・証券法の分野においては，これまでも経路依存性の議論がなされてき
てはいるものの，それを中国への企業買収法制の導入という局面に当てはめて
展開しているところが，本論文の独創的な成果として評価できる。中国の企業買
収法制の現状においては，CSRC による裁量的で不透明な処理が行われている
ところ，それには中国固有の社会的・経済的要因によってそうなってしまってい
ることを明らかにした上で，どのようにすればこの現状を克服することができ
るのかについて，単に会社法や証券法を改正することのみならず，社会的・経済
的要因に対する働きかけも含めた，多面的な解決策を提言している。 
 もちろん，本論文における提言がどこまで実効的であり得るのかについては，
中国社会の実情と照らし合わせての追加的な実証的・理論的検証が必要となる。
しかし，筆者がマクロな視点を縦横に利用して分析を進めていく様は魅力的で
あるし，中国社会への企業買収法制の導入という問題の分析は，いわゆる「法の
移植（legal transplant）」の議論一般に対して，貴重な一例を提供し，これから
の「法の移植」の議論の発展に対して貢献することも期待できる。 
 第二に，分析にあたっては，さまざまな視点が縦横に活用されている点も，評
価できる。すなわち，中国会社法・証券法の解釈という伝統的な法解釈学の視点
のみならず，米国法・英国法・EU 法を中心とした比較法によって，他国の「社
会実験」から教訓を得て中国法の規整のあり方に生かそうとする視点，および，
法ルールの背後にある実質的な利害関係を機能的に解き明かそうとする「法の
経済分析」の視点とが，個別の場面に応じて適切に使い分けられており，筆者の
法学研究者としての能力の高さが示されている。 
 もとより，本論文にも短所がないわけではない。第一に，本論文がキーワード
と活用している経路依存性という概念が，学会における標準的な経路依存性の
概念と異なる意味合いで使われているように見える点である。すなわち，経路依
存性という概念は，一般的には効率性に関する含みを持たせて利用されること
が多いけれども，筆者は必ずしもそのような含意をいれた分析をしていない。そ
のためか筆者は，より単純なシステム的硬直性という用語も利用しているが，そ
の分，読み手に混乱をもたらしかねないし，分析も浅いものになってしまう危険
性がある。 
 第二に，比較法で得られた分析結果と，中国法における提言との間の関係が，
必ずしも明確になっていない。中国法の分析の章においては，様々な具体的な提
言がなされているが，それらは本来，それぞれの制度のより詳細な検討を行った
上でなされるべきものである。本論文の比較法的な分析から，直ちに細かな法改
正の提案にまで結びつけるのには，少々論理の飛躍がある。 
 しかしながら，これらの分析が容易ではないことは事実であり，また，本論文
に示された筆者の分析・検討能力を前提にするならば，筆者が今後の研究活動を
通じて以上の難点を克服し，中国におけるありうべき解決策の全体像を解明す
ることは十分に期待することができる。 
 以上により，本論文を，博士（法学）の学位を授与するに値するものと認めら
れる。 
